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Over the last decade, empirical research has reached at least two key findings that 
have contributed to shape the common view of the determinants of growth. The first of those 
findings is a confirmation of the conclusions of the growth accounting literature. Namely, it is 
now agreed upon that factor accumulation is not the dominant engine of growth. This 
observation was for instance made by Easterly and Levine  (2001), who observed that 
productivity growth accounted for the greater part of cross-country growth differences. The 
same conclusion stems from the development accounting literature surveyed by 
Caselli (2005). That is, cross-country income differences result chiefly from differences in 
total factor productivity. 
At the same time, the accumulated evidence allowed to empirically settle the debate on 
the relationship between financial development and growth. More precisely, according to 
Honohan (2004, p.1), “the causal link between finance and growth is one of the most striking 
macroeconomic relationships uncovered in the past decade”. Since King and Levine (1993)’s 
seminal contribution, that strand of research surveyed by Levine  (2005) has repeatedly   2
reached the conclusion that financial development was instrumental in fostering growth, with 
various and always more refined techniques. 
Moreover, those two key findings indeed overlap. Thus, the impact of financial 
intermediary development seems to run mainly through its effect on total factor productivity. 
This is the central finding of Beck, Levine and Loayza  (2000), who also found that the 
relationship between financial intermediary development and productivity was much more 
robust than the relationship between financial intermediary development and capital 
accumulation. In other words, financial intermediary development robustly affects the main 
source of economic growth. As Mishkin (2005) points out, the causes of that phenomenon can 
be traced back to the real services provided by the financial sector. Specifically, the financial 
sector reduces transaction and information costs, and most of all acts as a coordinating device 
that allocates capital to efficient uses. The relevant allocation of capital not only determines 
its own productivity but also the productivity of all the other factors of production in the 
economy. The positive association between financial intermediary development and total 
factor productivity ensues. 
Important related questions however remain unsettled. The first one concerns the 
dimension of financial intermediary development that matters most for productivity. Financial 
intermediary development is indeed a complex concept, which ranges from the provision of 
financial services to the importance of commercial banks relative to the central bank in 
granting loans. Second, although an average positive relationship has regularly been observed 
between financial development and economic performance, one may wonder if it does not 
hide specificities of particular subsets of countries. In other words, one may wish to determine 
whether non-linearities exist in that relationship. Indeed, such non-linearities were uncovered 
by Rioja and Valev (2004a), but their analysis only focused on growth, and not on its sources, 
let alone productivity. 
Those are the questions that drive the present analysis. With the aim of addressing them, 
we use an original measure of total productivity, aggregate technical efficiency. That method 
originates from the microeconomic literature but was applied to aggregate production 
functions by Moroney and Lovell (1997). It consists in measuring countries’ relative distance 
to an estimated common production frontier. In theory, productivity gaps could be 
disaggregated as the sum of a technological component and an efficiency component. 
However, due to the magnitude of productivity gaps and the ease with which technology can 
be transferred across borders, technology gaps are a doubtful explanation.   3
As will appear below, there are several reasons why macroeconomic performance is 
better measured using this approach than more usual performance indicators, like total factor 
productivity. The first one is that it provides a synthetic measure of performance. Indeed, 
unlike basic productivity measures such as per capita income, efficiency scores allow to 
include several input dimensions in the evaluation of performances. As a result, output is not 
only compared to the labor stock, but also to the stocks of physical capital and human capital. 
Second, technical efficiency provides relative measures of performance. Namely, the 
estimated common production frontier allows the comparison of each country to its best 
possible practice given its endowments. Instead, other measures of productivity compare 
countries whose endowments may differ greatly, which casts doubt on the meaning of such 
comparisons. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the theoretical 
background of the influence of financial intermediary development on productivity. The way 
in which aggregate efficiency can be measured and analyzed is explained in the third section. 
The fourth section presents data and estimations. The last section concludes. 
 
2. The theoretical relationship between financial development and 
efficiency 
This section aims at briefly presenting the channels through which financial 
intermediary development may influence productivity. It is usually assumed that the 
relationship is positive but counterarguments suggest that a negative one cannot be ruled out. 
The channels through which financial development positively impacts efficiency all 
rest on the fact the financial system emerges to ease information, enforcement, and 
transactions costs in financing decisions and transactions. Levine (2005) thus considers four 
main functions provided by the financial system to reduce these costs.
1 Accordingly, financial 
development allows the financial system to exert those functions more efficiently. However, 
several theoretical explanations of the link between financial development and growth hinge 
on the accumulation of physical capital, which would be favored by financial development. 
Because the focus of the present paper is efficiency, we do not pay attention to the effects of 
these functions on capital accumulation. Moreover, we focus on financial intermediaries, 
meaning that we do not comment upon the role of financial markets. 
                                                 
1 He indeed considers five such functions, but the fifth, i.e. easing the trade, diversification and management of 
risk, is mainly provided by financial markets rather than financial intermediaries.   4
The first function of the financial system is to produce information ex ante about 
possible investments, and to provide a better allocation of capital. Financial intermediary 
development can improve productivity by this channel, as banks may reduce the costs of the 
evaluation of investment projects before the lending decision, and therefore allow a better 
allocation of capital. Indeed, several papers have underlined the reduction of the costs of 
acquiring and processing information (e.g. Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Furthermore, financial 
intermediaries may also promote technological innovation by identifying borrowers with the 
best chances of successfully launching innovations. 
The second function of the financial system is to monitor firms and to exert corporate 
governance. The reasoning here is straightforward. By increasing the control of firm 
managers, financial intermediaries raise the pressure on them to perform and consequently 
increase their productivity. That pressure is beneficial because of the moral hazard problem in 
the management of firms, which results from the conflicts of interest between firms’ 
managers and owners. The argument is notably based on the binding nature of debt. A loan 
contract with a financial intermediary reduces the “free cash-flow” at the disposal of 
managers (Jensen, 1986). Indeed, debt implies interest payment obligations that must be 
satisfied by managers, under the threat of bankruptcy if these obligations are not satisfied. 
Grossman and Hart  (1982) also argue that debt financing provides better incentives for 
managers to perform, as they aim to avoid the personal costs of bankruptcy. 
The financial system’s third function is the pooling of savings. Financial 
intermediaries can thus help improve firms’ productivity, by reducing the transaction costs 
associated with the mobilization of savings from different economic agents, and by reducing 
information costs for the savers. Therefore, this reduction of costs makes financial 
intermediaries useful to improve resource allocation, and also favor technological innovation. 
The last function of the financial system consists in easing the exchange of goods and 
services. Indeed, financial development contributes to develop media of exchange and 
consequently facilitates the exchange of goods and services. Following Adam Smith’s 
argument, this extension facilitates specialization, which is the main force behind productivity 
improvements. 
A wide range of arguments therefore explains why financial intermediary development 
should raise productivity. They are however qualified by a few counterarguments that 
emphasize the aftermath of financial liberalization. Namely, financial liberalization is likely to 
increase the probability of financial crises, and thus hamper growth. Rajan (1994) notably 
argues that bankers’ incentives are affected by financial liberalization in such a way that it   5
results in credit expansion and then in a greater volatility of output growth. In a closely 
related model, Dell’Aricia and Marquez (2006) show how financial liberalization in emerging 
countries can lead to a greater volatility of credit and a lower output growth. 
These theoretical arguments are supported by empirical elements on developing 
countries. While De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) observe a positive relationship between 
growth and financial development on a sample of 100 developed and developing countries on 
the period 1960-1985, they also point out that this relationship becomes negative when the 
investigation is restricted to Latin American countries. This finding is then interpreted as the 
consequence of the negative effects of financial liberalization during the 70s and the 80s in 
these countries. 
Furthermore, Loayza and Rancière (2005) analyze the short and the long-term impacts 
of financial development on growth on a sample of 75 countries during the period 1960-2000. 
They conclude that the effects of financial development depend on the  perspective taken. 
They thus find a positive long-term relationship between both variables, which coexists with a 
negative one in the short-term. They also explain this negative impact by the effects of 
financial liberalization in developing countries, this interpretation being supported by the 
observation that negative short-term effects are only significant in financially fragile 
countries. 
In a nutshell, the literature provides several arguments explaining why financial 
intermediary development favors productivity, but the negative effects of financial 
liberalization qualify this positive impact in developing countries. Which effects dominate in 
which countries is therefore an empirical issue. By the same token the role of the various 
dimensions of financial development may evolve with economic development. The next 
section explains how we investigated those two issues. 
 
3. Methodology 
In this section, we first explain how we measured aggregate efficiency. We then 
present how we studied its determinants. 
 
3.1. Measuring efficiency 
Our first task here is to measure macroeconomic efficiency. We more specifically focus 
on technical efficiency, which measures how close a country’s production is to what that   6
country’s optimal production would be for using the same bundle of inputs. We resort to the 
stochastic frontier approach to estimate technical efficiency, following the former applications 
of Adkins, Moomaw and Savvides (2002) and Méon and Weill (2005) among others.
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Once each country’s inefficiency is assessed, its relationship with financial development 
must be measured. A natural way of doing it would be to resort to a two-stage approach. That 
approach would consist in estimating efficiency scores in a first stage, then regressing them 
on the relevant set of explanatory variables in a second stage. Though intuitive, this approach 
is inconsistent, because it assumes in the first stage that inefficiencies are independently 
distributed, while the second-stage regression does not respect that independence assumption. 
We consequently resort to the one-stage approach developed by Battese and 
Coelli (1995). It consists in estimating a model that includes a production frontier as well as 
an equation in which inefficiencies are specified as a function of explanatory variables. This 
approach is more consistent than the two-stage approach, which may explain its popularity in 
studies of the determinants of technical efficiency at the aggregate level, such as Adkins, 
Moomaw and Savvides (2002) or Méon and Weill (2005). 
The estimated stochastic frontier model thus includes two equations. The first one is the 
specification of the production frontier. We assume a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas 
                                                 
2 Weill (2006) compares the efficiency measures obtained at the aggregate level with the stochastic frontier 
approach and with DEA (data envelopment analysis), an alternative technique based on linear programming 
tools. He concludes in favour of the robustness of efficiency measures to the choice of the frontier technique.   7
production technology
3, which we write as: 
 
ln (Y/L)it = α0 + α1 ln (K/L)it + α2 ln (H/L)it + α3 t + vit − uit    ( 1 )  
 
where i indexes countries and t years of observation. (Y/L), (K/L), (H/L) are respectively 
output per worker, capital per worker, and human capital per worker. Variable t accounts for 
the drift of the common production function over time. It is set to one during the first period, 
two during the second period, and so on. vit is a random disturbance, reflecting luck or 
measurement errors. It is assumed to have a normal distribution with zero mean and variance 
σv². uit is an inefficiency term, capturing technical inefficiencies. It is a one-sided component 
with variance σu². As is common in the literature, we assume a half-normal distribution for 
the inefficiency term. 
The second equation specifies inefficiencies as: 
 
uit = δ zit + Wit           ( 2 )  
 
where uit is country i’s inefficiency, zit is a p×1 vector of p explanatory variables, δ is a 
1×p vector of parameters to be estimated, Wit the random variable defined by the truncation of 
the normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ ² (σ ² = σu² + σv²). 
Expressions 1 and 2 underline an additional advantage of efficiency scores obtained 
with stochastic frontier approach with respect to standard productivity measures that has not 
been mentioned so far. Namely, whereas total factor productivity measures performance by 
the whole difference between a country’s actual and estimated productions, the stochastic 
frontier approach allows to split the distance to the production frontier between an 
inefficiency term and a random error, taking exogenous events into account. 
 
3.2. Testing the hypotheses 
Once the general method that allows to measure and explain aggregate efficiency has 
been developed, testing hypotheses requires to list the variables that determine efficiency, that 
is to specify the arguments of vector zit. As underlined in the introduction, we wish to test two 
embedded questions. The first one concerns the general association between finance and 
                                                 
3 When Hall and Jones (1999) estimate aggregate productivity in a related cross-country study, they find that 
results obtained with a Cobb-Douglas production function are very similar to the results obtained when the 
production function is not restricted to that specification. Kneller and Stevens (2003) reached similar conclusions 
when estimating aggregate efficiency frontiers. 
We adopt constant returns-to-scale because, as Moroney and Lovell (1997, p.1086) put it, “at the economy-wide 
level, constant returns-to-scale is virtually compelling”.   8
productivity, and more precisely the facet of financial intermediary development that affects 
efficiency. We therefore in turn include among the regressors three canonical measures of 
financial intermediary development that have repeatedly been used in the literature since King 
and Levine (1993). Namely, we first use the ratio of the volume of credit to private enterprises 
to GDP (PrivateCredit). That ratio measures the extent to which credit is allocated to private 
firms, as opposed to government or state-owned firms. It is consequently a measure of the 
financial sector size, which isolates credit issued to the private sector. It is therefore a measure 
of financial intermediary development considering who benefits from the credit. 
We then use the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP as a second measure of financial 
development (LiquidLiabilities). That ratio equals currency plus demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries divided by GDP. It is therefore also 
a measure of the overall size of the financial sector, also known as financial depth. Unlike the 
variable PrivateCredit, this indicator takes into account the provision of services by financial 
intermediaries. Levine, Loayza and Beck. (2000) however mentioned shortcomings of this 
indicator. It is indeed an imperfect indicator of the quantity of services provided by financial 
intermediaries, as it involves double counting of deposits by including deposits by one 
financial intermediary in another. Furthermore, it does not provide information on the 
effectiveness of the financial sector in reducing the costs of transactions and of acquiring 
information. 
Finally, we also measure the role of commercial banks versus central banks in 
financing the economy, thanks to our third ratio (CommercialCentralBank), which is defined 
as the ratio of commercial banks assets divided by the sum of commercial banks and central 
banks assets. It is expected to be positively linked with efficiency, as commercial banks are 
more likely to identify profitable investments, to monitor their customers, and to provide 
good-quality services. Consequently, it is a measure of financial intermediary development 
taking into account who grants credit. 
Two remarks need to be made on the three measures of financial intermediary 
development. PrivateCredit and LiquidLiabilities measure different dimensions of the size of 
the financial sector. PrivateCredit and CommercialCentralBank are linked with the 
importance of the private sector in the economy. 
Namely, while this point is obvious for PrivateCredit, it can also be made for 
CommercialCentralBank because the relative importance of commercial banks is a proxy for 
the role of private banks in the banking industry. We complement the set of explanatory 
variables by the set of control variables that has become standard in the finance and growth   9
literature. Namely, we add the openness to trade ratio, the inflation rate, and the ratio of 
government expenditures to GDP to the arguments of vector zit. Finally, we also control for 
ethnic fractionalization and latitude, which have been found to affect growth and efficiency 
(see e.g. Méon and Weill, 2005). 
Jointly estimating expressions (1) and (2) with the set of dependent variables 
described above allows to determine the average association between financial development 
and growth. We do so by including the following equation modeling inefficiency for each 
index of the financial intermediary development
4: 
ui = δ0 + δ1 Opennessi + δ2  Latitudei  + δ3  EthnicFractioni + δ4  Inflationi 
 +  δ5  GovernmentExpendituresi + δ6 Financei + Wi     (3) 
 
Where ui is country i’s inefficiency, Wi the random variable defined by the truncation 
of the normal distribution. Openness is proxied by the measure provided by Sachs and 
Warner (1995). This measure is a dummy variable, constructed upon the fact that a country is 
considered as closed if it fails one of five different criteria (the black market premium, the fact 
that the overall system is capitalist or communist, the extent of government intervention in the 
export sector, the level of tariff rates, the non-tariff barrier coverage). It is equal to one 
whether the country is open, and zero elsewhere. Latitude measures the country’s distance to 
the equator. EthnicFraction is an index of ethnic fractionalization. Inflation stands for the 
truncated inflation rate, and GovernmentExpenditures measures the ratio of government 
expenditures to GDP. Finance is the relevant index of financial intermediary development. 
We use in turn the three indices that have been described above. 
The above method allows testing the average relationship between financial 
development and aggregate efficiency over the whole sample. However, as that relationship 
may differ across subgroups of countries, we moreover investigate how it varies with 
economic development. To do so, we first run all the estimations anew with the addition of an 
interaction term between the relevant financial variable and the log of per capita GDP, meant 
to proxy economic development. This provides a first insight in the way in which the impact 
of financial development evolves with economic development. 
That strategy however imposes the impact of financial development to be a linear 
function of economic development. To test for the possibility of a non-linear relationship, we 
use a second method that allows to separately assess the relationship in each quintile of the 
                                                 
4 It has to be stressed that the equation (3) is the reformulation of the equation (2) of the stochastic frontier model 
applied in this work, where the explanatory variables are defined.   10
sample. More specifically, we first define a dummy variable for each of the first four quintiles 
of the sample defined over GDP per capita, then interact those dummies with the relevant 
financial development variable. When included in the set of regressors, those interacted terms 
allow to determine how the relationship between financial development and inefficiency 
differs across quintiles. 
 
4. Data and results 
Before we perform the analysis and comment our results, we need to present our 
dataset. This is done in the next subsection. The following subsection displays the result of 
the estimation of the average relationship on the whole sample, while subsection 4.3 displays 
the results of the estimations that discriminate sub-samples as a function of their economic 
development. 
4.1. Data 
Macroeconomic data for the estimation of the production frontier are the same as in 
Easterly and Levine (2001), and were downloaded from the Growth Development Network 
database of the World Bank. Output is measured in purchasing power parity dollars. Capital 
was computed by Easterly and Levine  (2001) using aggregate investment thanks to a 
perpetual inventory method, where a year’s capital stock is equal to the previous year’s capital 
stock plus investment in that year minus depreciation.
5 Labor is measured as the number of 
workers. Human capital is proxied by the total number of years of schooling in the working-
age population over 15 years old. It is taken from Barro and Lee’s (2000) education dataset 
and was downloaded from the Economic Growth Resources website. 
All financial data and most control variables are taken from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Levine (2000)’s dataset. However ethnic fractionalization and distance to the equator come 
from the Growth Development Network database of the World Bank. 
 
                                                 




Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Y/L 11,602.05  13,114.10  448.60  42,463.06 
K/L 36,002.08  43,264.30  973.76  147,702.92 
H/L 10.26  4.61  2.73  18.76 
        
PrivateCredit 0.4520  0.3593  0.0211  1.7972 
LiquidLiabilities 0.4830  0.3028  0.0434  1.9334 
CommmercialCentralBank 0.7892  0.1980  0.0684  0.9946 
        
Latitude 26.18  16.84  0.51  60.21 
Ethnic Fractionalisation  37.38  29.79  0  89.00 
Inflation 0.18  0.21  0.03  1.35 
GovernmentExpenditures 17.87  8.24  6.01  52.32 
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the means by country. Y/L, K/L, H/L, are respectively output per 
worker, physical capital per worker, and human capital per worker. We remind that openness is a dummy 
variable and inflation is the logarithm of the inflation rate in percentage plus unity. 
 
Unless specified otherwise, all control variables were used in level in expression (2). 
The inflation rate stands as an exception. Namely, as it can take extreme values, we used the 
logarithm of that variable to limit the influence of such observations.
6 
All in all, we ended up with a sample of 47 countries over 1980-1995. We use four 
years: 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995. The countries in the sample are both developed and 
developing, as can be shown in the list of countries provided in the Appendix. In the next 
section, we document the extent to which those differences are related to financial 
intermediary development. 
 
4.2. Estimation of the average relationship 
Table 2 displays the results of the estimation of expression (1) and (2). The upper-half 
of that table presents the coefficients of the production function, while the lower half is 
devoted to the determinants of inefficiency, that is expression (2). We used the Frontier 
                                                 
6 More precisely, as inflation can also equal zero, we use log(1 + inflation).   12
software version 4.1 developed by Coelli  (1996) to perform the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the stochastic frontier model. It must be stressed that it is inefficiency that is 
explained in the second equation, and that a minus sign consequently indicates that an 
increase in the explanatory variable implies a reduction in inefficiency, in other words a rise 
in efficiency. 
The upper-part of the table reveals that the coefficients of the production function are 
fairly stable across estimations and always significant. Moreover, those coefficients are in line 
with other estimations that can be found in the literature. Kneller and Stevens (2003) for 
instance report coefficients for physical and human capital that are of the same order of 
magnitude. In addition, Adkins, Moomaw and Savvides (2002) also find a negative trend in 
the production function. 
The lower part of table 2 allows to gauge the determinants of inefficiency. All 
significant control variables are intuitively signed. It thus appears that greater openness is in 
general associated with less inefficiency, although not robustly so. Likewise, inefficiency 
decreases as one moves further away from the equator, which is intuitive. That relationship is 
moreover very robust and always significant at the one percent level of confidence. 
On the other hand, greater ethnic fractionalization is associated with more 
inefficiency, as revealed by the positive coefficient it exhibits. This finding is consistent with 
the view that ethnic fractionalization leads to social and political unrest, which hampers 
efficiency and productivity. However that variable fails to be significant when financial 
intermediary development is measured thanks to the liquidity ratio, suggesting some 
colinearity between those variables. GovernmentExpenditures is also significantly positive. 
This implies that efficiency decreases with the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, 
which may be due to some crowding-out phenomenon. Finally, inflation is never significant 
at conventional levels. 
   13
Table 2 
Results for the estimation of the average relationship 
 
 PrivateCredit  LiquidLiabilities CommercialCentralBank








































































Log−likelihood  47.73  44.84  47.14 
N  188  188  188 
K/L and H/L are respectively physical and human capital per worker. Absolute t-statistics are displayed in 
parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 
10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 
However, the key variables of interest are those that proxy financial intermediary 
development, which appear on the bottom line of table 2. The first result is that financial 
intermediary development is in general associated with less inefficiency, as underlined by the 
negative coefficients that affect financial intermediary development variables. This is in line 
with the view, put forward by Levine (2005) and Mishkin (2005), that the financial sector 
provides real services that contribute to improving the allocation of capital. 
However, all dimensions of financial intermediary development do not seem to be as 
effective in improving macroeconomic efficiency. Indeed, if the development of credit to the 
private sector and the relative importance of commercial banks in financing the economy are 
significantly associated with efficiency, financial depth in itself does not seem to affect it. 
More precisely if the coefficients exhibited by the variables PrivateCredit and   14
CommercialCentralBanks are both significant at the five percent level, LiquidLiabilities fails 
to pass the ten percent test by far. 
The main conclusions of this first series of tests is that financial intermediary 
development matters for efficiency on average, but that what really matters is the share of the 
private sector, both in allocating and receiving credit. Financial depth as such does not indeed 
seem to affect efficiency. However, those conclusions only hold on average, that is for the 
whole sample. It may well be that the various facets of financial intermediary development 
play a different role at various stages of economic development. The next subsection 
investigates that possibility. 
 
4.3. The impact of financial intermediary development as a function of economic 
development 
Table 3 displays the results of the estimation of the relationships that include an 
interaction of financial intermediary development with economic development. The upper 
part of that table shows that the results pertaining to the parameters of the production function 
and control variables do not change with respect to table 2 both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. One may also remark that the fit of the estimation of expression 2, as measured 
by log-likelihood, increases, which is a hint against pooling all observations regardless of 
their economic development. However, the result of interest regards the evolution of the 
impact of financial intermediaries’ development as economic development increases. In that 
respect, the broad picture obtained with the three measures of financial development is 
consistent across estimations, although details may slightly differ. 
More specifically, the first column of table 3 displays the results that pertain to 
PrivateCredit. In that column it appears that the coefficient on financial development is 
significantly positive while the interaction term exhibits a negative coefficient. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients is such that the overall impact of financial 
development on inefficiency is positive in least developed countries, while it becomes 
increasingly negative when output per capita exceeds a given threshold.
7 
 
                                                 
7 More specifically, the logarithm of per capita income in thousands dollars must be greater than 
0.64/0.49 ≅ 1.42, which means that the threshold amounts to 4140 USD. About one half of the observations 
included in our sample fall below that threshold.   15
Table 3 
Results for the estimation including the interaction with economic development 
 
 PrivateCredit  LiquidLiabilities CommercialCentralBank














































































Log−likelihood  60.35  61.79  117.05 
N  188  188  188 
K/L and H/L are respectively physical and human capital per worker. Absolute t-statistics are displayed in 
parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 
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Table 4 
Results for the estimation including the squared financial intermediary development variable 
 PrivateCredit  LiquidLiabilities CommercialCentralBank
































































































Log−likelihood  58.51  71.71  69.09 
N  188  188  188 
K/L and H/L are respectively physical and human capital per worker. Quintile1, Quintile2, Quintile3, Quintile4 
are dummy variables respectively equal to one whether the observation belongs to the first, second, third or 
fourth quintile defined over GDP per capita. Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the 
coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 
A similar diagnosis can be made with the variable LiquidLiabilities, which appears in 
the second column of table 3. There again, the coefficient on financial development is 
significantly positive while the interaction term exhibits a negative coefficient. This is striking 
insofar as that measure of economic development did not appear significantly associated with 
aggregate efficiency in table 2. This provides an additional argument in favor of   17
discriminating countries according to their economic development in our estimations. As for 
PrivateCredit, the magnitudes of the point estimates imply that the development of financial 
intermediaries can be detrimental to efficiency below a given GDP per capita and beneficial 
beyond it.
8 
The results pertaining to the CommercialCentralBank index of financial development 
are slightly different. Namely, it is found that the coefficient on the variable itself is 
insignificant, but that the coefficient on the interaction term is negative. This implies that a 
greater involvement of commercial banks in the allocation of credit is beneficial to efficiency 
across the whole sample, but that the effect is greater in wealthier economies. 
As mentioned above, those conclusions rest on a specification of the relationship 
between inefficiency and financial development that imposes that the coefficient of financial 
development be a linear function of economic development. Since that relationship may be 
non linear, we also resort to an alternative strategy where we estimate a different coefficient 
in each quintile of our sample. The results of that strategy are displayed in table 4. 
As before, the results of table 4 confirm those of other estimations, as far as the 
production function and control variables are concerned. They also confirm the results of 
table 3 pertaining to the variation of the relationship between financial development and 
aggregate efficiency as economic development evolves. In addition, the picture sketched is 
independent of the measure of financial development that is used. Namely, given the 
coefficient of the financial development variable and those of quintile dummies, it appears 
that the impact of financial development on efficiency is always negative in the poorest 
quintiles. It then becomes almost inexistent in the median quintile before it turns positive, and 
increasingly so, in the richest quintiles. We therefore find that financial development can be 
detrimental to aggregate efficiency in poor countries and becomes beneficial in richer 
countries. Its impact is close to zero in middle-income countries. 
Our results are reminiscent of those obtained by Rioja and Valev  (2004b). These 
authors analyze the relationship between financial development and two sources of growth – 
capital accumulation and productivity growth – on a sample of 74 countries during the period 
1961-1995, by using the three same measures of financial development as those used here. 
They find that the link between financial development and productivity growth depends on 
the level of economic development. Financial development contributes positively to growth 
for estimations performed on the full sample of countries. However the positive impact on 
                                                 
8 The estimated threshold here amounts to 6025 USD, which means that 60% of the observations of our sample 
fall under that threshold.   18
productivity growth is only significant in middle-income countries and high-income 
countries. Indeed, the relationship between financial development and growth is significantly 
positive in low-income countries only because of the positive impact of financial development 
on capital accumulation. 
Therefore, their conclusion that “the strong contribution of financial development to 
productivity growth does not occur until a country has reached a certain income level” (p.139) 
can be related to our finding of a positive relationship between financial development and 
efficiency only in countries above a certain level of economic development. 
Our results can also be connected to those of DeGregorio and Guidotti (1995) and 
Loayza and Rancière (2005) on the relationship between financial development and growth. 
Both studies conclude that that relationship can be negative in developing countries, and 
blame it on the effects of financial liberalization. Namely, as pointed out notably by 
DeGregorio and Guidotti (1995), financial liberalization may have contributed to increase the 
likelihood of financial crises and thus hampered productivity. 
The same phenomenon may explain our results regarding the differentiated 
relationship between financial development and efficiency. It has indeed to be stressed that 
our investigation focuses on the 1980s and the 1990s, i.e. a period marked by moves toward 
greater financial liberalization in developing countries but also by episodes of financial crises. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have examined the relationship between financial intermediary 
development and aggregate productivity, thanks to an efficiency frontier analysis. Our results 
show that financial intermediary development exerts on average a positive impact on 
aggregate productivity. However we find strong evidence that this relationship is conditional 
on the level of economic development. The lower economic development the weaker is the 
impact of financial development on aggregate efficiency. That impact can even become 
negative in the poorest countries. Therefore, our main conclusion is that financial 
intermediary development only exerts a positive impact if a certain level of economic 
development is reached. It is therefore no sufficient condition to ensure high aggregate 
productivity.  
This analysis can still be extended in a number of ways. First, if the negative effects of 
financial liberalization on productivity runs through the occurrence of financial crises, then 
the impact of those crises should be analyzed. Second, the present analysis has not tackled the   19
impact of the development of financial markets. As it complements financial intermediaries, it 
should also be analyzed either alone or jointly with the development of financial 
intermediation, in the line of Beck and Levine  (2004). Furthermore, the causality of the 
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